Reputation and Career Concerns by Leonardo Martinez




This paper studies Holmstrom’s [1999] seminal model of career concerns, but considers that a
small change in the beliefs about the agent’s future productivity may imply a large change in his
compensation–because, for example, the agent may be ﬁred or promoted. This allows us to study how
the agent’s eﬀort decision depends on his current reputation–with reputation we refer to the beliefs
about the agent’s future productivity. We shall show that the market’s and the agent’s problems can
be written recursively. We ﬁnd that the relationship between the agent’s decisions and his current rep-
utation is typically nonmonotonic: equilibrium eﬀort is hump-shaped over reputation. Furthermore,
equilibrium eﬀort may be higher if there is less dispersion in the distribution of abilities; it may be higher
later in the agent’s career; and it may be higher than the eﬃcient eﬀort level.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Fama (1980) suggests that agents are disciplined by the opportunities provided by the markets for their
services, both within and outside the ﬁrm: agents are disciplined by their career concerns. These
incentives are present in situations where the labor market does not know the agent’s future productivity,
but it learns about it by observing performance. In general, the employer has to pay more to the agent when
the agent is believed to be more productive because otherwise another ﬁrm would oﬀer more. Moreover,
if it is believed that the agent has higher productive ability, this may also allow him to work in a “better”
position. Thus, the agent’s compensation depends on the labor market’s belief about his future productivity,
and his decisions are inﬂuenced by his aspiration of aﬀecting his future reputation–with reputation we
refer to the beliefs about the agent’s future productivity.
Career-concern incentives matter in many lines of work. For example, an assistant professor exerts
eﬀort writing papers in part because the decision on his tenure and his future salaries depend on the
beliefs about his future productivity–determined by his past production. Studying these incentives is
necessary for understanding the dynamics of the agent’s decisions over his career, and for designing optimal
compensation contracts that complement these incentives (see Gibbons and Murphy [1992]).
This paper presents a framework that allows us to study how the agent’s reputation aﬀects his decisions.1
Would the agent exert more eﬀort when his current reputation is bad than when his current reputation is
good? If the agent makes decisions to inﬂuence his future reputation, it seems natural to expect that his
decision would depend on his current reputation. Since the agent’s reputation most likely changes over
his career, one cannot characterize the dynamics of the agent’s decisions without understanding how his
reputation aﬀects his decisions. Understanding how the agent’s reputation aﬀects his decisions is also a
ﬁrst step toward understanding how contracts complementing career-concern incentives should depend on
the agent’s reputation (or his past performance).
As a natural ﬁrst step toward understanding how the agent’s current reputation aﬀects the strength of
1Carefully chosen assumptions allow previous studies to sidestep this. See, for example, Holmstrom [1999], Gibbons and
Murphy [1992], Besley and Case [1995], Prendergast and Stole [1996], Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole [1999a, 1999b], Persson
and Tabellini [2000], Shi and Svensson [2002], Alesina and Tabellini [2003], Le Borgne and Lockwood [2004], Ahmad and
Martinez [2005], and Eggertsson and Le Borgne [2005].
2his incentives, this paper considers only one departure from Holmstrom [1999] that makes eﬀort depend
on reputation. We shall study a diﬀerent compensation scheme in a T-period version of Holmstrom’s
[1999] seminal model. That is, with the exception of the assumption on the compensation scheme, the
framework studied here is exactly the framework in Holmstrom [1999]. It will be shown that departing
from Holmstrom’s [1999] framework only in the compensation scheme considered allows us to study how
equilibrium eﬀort depends on reputation. The paper shows that we can easily represent recursively
dynamic models of career concerns and characterize the eﬀort decisions. The dynamic eﬀects explained
in the paper are robust to changes in our (or Holmstrom’s) assumptions.
First, we shall consider a general career-concern compensation scheme in which the agent’s compen-
sation depends on the market’s belief about the agent’s future productivity in an unspeciﬁed way. It
is shown that the players’ (the market’s and the agent’s) problems can be set up recursively. In other
words, for all histories of the game that imply the same beliefs about the agent’s ability, compensation
and equilibrium eﬀort are the same. This insight greatly facilitates the study of career concerns when we
consider that equilibrium eﬀort depends on the agent’s current reputation. The existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium eﬀort is also discussed.
Second, as a benchmark, we shall present a framework in which the agent’s compensation is given by
his expected productivity as in previous studies of career concerns. With this assumption, the expected
compensation is linear in eﬀort and the marginal gain from exerting eﬀort does not depend on the agent’s
reputation. Thus, the agent’s equilibrium decisions do not depend on his reputation.
Finally, we shall investigate a discontinuous compensation scheme. That is, we shall consider the case
where a small change in the agent’s reputation implies a large change in his compensation. There are many
situations where the agent’s compensation is not a continuous function of his reputation. For example,
t h ea g e n tm a yb ea s s i g n e dt od i ﬀerent levels in a hierarchy or to diﬀerent sectors in the economy according
to his reputation, and these reassignments often imply a discontinuous change in compensation.2 As an
illustration, consider that there is an important diﬀerence between the lowest salary in the NBA (National
Basketball Association) and the highest salary in the NBA Development League. With the discontinuous
2This idea is formalized by, for example, MacDonald [1982], Bernhardt [1995], Gibbons and Waldman [1999], and Persson
and Tabellini [2000].
3compensation scheme, we can study how the agent’s reputation inﬂuences his equilibrium decisions.3
Would an agent with a better reputation face stronger career-concern incentives, or would such an agent
be more diﬃcult to control? Consequently, should contract incentives be stronger if the agent’s reputation
is better? We shall show that the relationship between the strength of career-concern incentives and
reputation is typically nonmonotonic: equilibrium eﬀort is hump-shaped over reputation.
We shall also show that some of the conclusions presented in previous studies of career concerns (and
replicated here) are not robust to changes in the career-concern compensation scheme considered. First,
the agent faces an intertemporal eﬀort-smoothing decision, in contrast to the intratemporal eﬀort decision
more commonly studied. Second, equilibrium eﬀort may be higher if there is less dispersion in the
distribution of abilities. Third, the agent may decide to exert more eﬀort later in his career. Fourth, the
equilibrium eﬀort level may be higher than the eﬃcient eﬀort level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework. Section 3 shows
that the players’ problems can be set up recursively. Section 4 characterizes equilibrium eﬀort when the
agent’s compensation is given by his expected productivity. Section 5 characterizes equilibrium eﬀort for
a discontinuous compensation scheme. Section 6 concludes and suggests possible extensions.
2F r a m e w o r k
This paper studies diﬀerent compensation schemes in a T-period version of the main model in Holmstrom’s
[1999] seminal paper. For simplicity, we shall focus on the stationary case of that model. It will be shown
that departing from Holmstrom’s [1999] framework only in the compensation scheme considered, allows us
to study how the agent’s decisions depend on his reputation. With the exception of the assumption on
the compensation scheme, the framework studied here is exactly the framework in Holmstrom [1999].
For now, we assume only that the compensation is a function of the market’s belief about the agent’s
future productivity (as in every model of career concerns).4 With this assumption, Section 3 shows that
3Reputation would also aﬀect eﬀort with non-linear compensation schemes. The framework presented here would also be
useful to study these situations. The dynamic eﬀects would be the same (but reputation would also aﬀect eﬀort through
other channels).
4As in previous studies of career concerns, in this paper, the only role of the employer (or principal) is to learn about the
4the players’ problems can be set up recursively. Examples of such compensation scheme are presented in
sections 4 and 5.
2.1 The environment
Consider a dynamic game played by the agent and the market for his services. Time is discrete and indexed
by t ∈ {0,1,...,T}. At the beginning of period t, the market decides on the agent’s compensation wt,
and the agent consumes wt. The agent then decides on his eﬀort level, at ≥ 0. Output yt is a stochastic
function of the agent’s ability, ¯ ηt,a n do fat. In particular,
(1) yt = at +¯ ηt + εt,
where εt is a normally distributed random variable with expected value 0 and precision hε (the variance is
1
hε). After the agent chooses his eﬀort level, εt and ¯ ηt are realized.
The agent’s ability evolves as a random walk. In particular, ¯ ηt+1 =¯ ηt +βt,w h e r eβt is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean 0 and precision hβ.5
Neither the market nor the agent knows the agent’s ability.6 At the beginning of the game, the market’s
agent’s future productivity and to determine the compensation according to his belief. The exact relationship between the
principal’s belief about the agent’s future productivity and the compensation depends on the labor market structure considered
(see, for example, MacDonald [1982], Bernhardt [1995], Gibbons and Waldman [1999], and Persson and Tabellini [2000]). The
analysis of this relationship is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we want to focus on the incentives generated when the
agent’s compensation depends on his future productivity.
5As is explained later, assuming that ability evolves over time allows us to focus on the case in which the precision of the
beliefs about the agent’s ability does not depend on the number of periods the agent worked. Moreover, there are many
situations in which a worker’s ability changes over time (this is the case, for example, in professional sports). This assumption
may also represent situations in which the agent’s tasks are changing over time and his ability depend on the tasks he is
focusing on (for example, a manager who is concerned primarily about decreasing production costs may be forced to focus
on marketing because of a new competitor). Martinez [2004] presents a ﬁring model of career concerns in which an agent’s
ability does not change over time and the main results presented here are not aﬀected.
6An agent may be ignorant of his ability when met with new tasks. This assumption also deepens the understanding of
situations where an agent’s success does not only depend on his individual ability but also on the ability of others working
with him.
5and the agent’s beliefs about the agent’s ability are normally distributed with mean b0 and precision h¯ η.
Deﬁne ηt ≡ ¯ ηt + εt = yt − at.T h a t i s , ηt is the stochastic component of yt. It is the signal about
the agent’s ability extracted from observing output in period t when it is believed that the agent exerted
eﬀort at.
There is a cost to exerting eﬀort, c(at),w i t hc0 (at) ≥ 0, c00 (at) > 0,a n dc0 (0) = 0.E a c h p e r i o d t,t h e
agent’s utility equals wt − c(at).L e t δ ∈ (0,1) denote the players’ discount factor.
Each period, players observe yt while ¯ ηt and εt are unobservable. The market does not observe the
agent’s eﬀort level (which is of course known by the agent).7
It is assumed that the agent plays a pure strategy. In period t, when the agent decides on his eﬀort
level, his information includes the history of output realizations, yt−1 =( y0,y 1,...,y t−1),a n dt h eh i s t o r yo f
eﬀort levels, at−1 =( a0,a 1,...,a t−1). For all t>0,l e tat
¡
yt−1,a t−1¢
denote the agent’s period-t optimal




0 denote the ﬁrst-period equilibrium eﬀort. When the




period-t compensation when the market’s information is given by yt−1.9
2.2 Equilibrium concept
Models of career concerns can be formalized as dynamic games of incomplete information or Bayesian
games. We shall use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as the equilibrium concept.
2.3 The learning process
From this point forward, belief refers to belief about the agent’s ability unless stated otherwise (as when
referring to the market’s belief about the eﬀort level the agent exerted).
7Alternatively, it can be assumed that the agent’s action is observable but the principal is uninformed (see, for example,
Shi’s and Svensson’s [2002] political-budget-cycle model of career concerns).





does not depend on y
t−1 and a
t−1. We shall study








9Given that the compensation depends on the history of outputs, by exerting eﬀort at t (and changing yt according to
equation 1) the agent may aﬀect his compensation in every future period.
6Players learn about the agent’s ability using Bayesian learning. For simplicity, the precision of the
noise in the random walk ability process βt is chosen to make the mean of the distribution suﬃcient for
characterizing beliefs. Thus, we assume that
hβ =
h2
¯ η + h¯ ηhε
hε
.
With this assumption, the precision of the period-t+1beliefs about the signal ηt+1 is always equal to the
precision of the period-t beliefs about the signal ηt and does not depend on the number of observations of
the agent’s output. This precision is given by
(2) H ≡
h¯ ηhε
hε + h¯ η
.
Consequently, Holmstrom’s [1999] tenure eﬀect in the determination of players’ decisions is not present.
H e r e ,t h ef o c u si so nt h ee ﬀects of reputation which previous studies left unexplored.
Let bmt and bat denote the mean of the market’s and the agent’s beliefs at the beginning of period t
(from here on, at period t). We shall refer to belief with mean b as belief b. When the players’ beliefs are
coincidental at t,l e tbt = bmt = bat denote their beliefs.
2.4 Equilibrium learning
In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the market always believes it is on the equilibrium path, i.e., it assigns
probability one to the agent exerting the equilibrium eﬀort level in every period.




. The only information available to the market is the history of outputs yt−1.
Using yt−1 and its previous inferences regarding the eﬀort levels exerted by the agent, the market infers



















denotes the history of past eﬀort levels inferred by the market when yt−2 was observed. Recall that at the
beginning of the game, the market and the agent have the same information, and, therefore, the market
can infer a∗
0 correctly.
7Observing yt allows the players to infer ηt (and to update their beliefs) by using their knowledge about
the eﬀort exerted by the agent (either at or at
¡
yt−1¢
) and the production function. The agent knows the





≡ yt − at
¡
yt−1¢




On the equilibrium path, the eﬀort level expected by the market is equal to the eﬀort level exerted by the
agent, and the signal the market infers is equal to the signal the agent infers. The market’s inference is
wrong, however, when the agent deviates from equilibrium behavior.
According to Bayes’ rule, the mean of the beliefs at t +1is a weighted sum of the mean at t and the
inferred period-t signal where the weight of the mean at t is given by
(3) µ =
h¯ η
h¯ η + hε
.
Thus, the agent’s belief at t +1is characterized by
bat+1 = B (bat,ηt) ≡ µbat +( 1− µ)ηt,
and the market’s belief at t +1is characterized by





= µbmt +( 1− µ)
¡




The market’s belief at t +1is a function of its belief at t, the true signal, the eﬀort level exerted by the






On the equilibrium path, given that the signal inferred by the market is equal to the signal inferred by the
agent, the market’s and the agent’s beliefs are coincidental.
Of course, to ﬁnd the agent’s equilibrium strategy, oﬀ equilibrium play has to be considered. However,
the structure of the game (one cannot infer from observables that the agent has deviated) and Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium imply that the market puts full probability on equilibrium play by the agent. Con-
sequently, the market believes that the agent’s belief coincides with his belief.
The agent knows that the market believes that the agent always exerted eﬀort according to at−1 ¡
yt−2¢
.
Several histories of output realizations and eﬀort levels result in the same beliefs. Let Y t ¡
b,at¢
denote
8the set of histories yt that imply belief b when the updating was done considering that eﬀort was ex-
erted according to at. For all yt−1 ∈ Y t−1 ¡
b,at−1 ¡
yt−2¢¢
, the agent believes that the market’s belief is
characterized by bmt = b.
3 A recursive formulation
In this section, we shall show that the beliefs (and t)a r et h er e l e v a n ts t a t ev a r i a b l e s . A se x p l a i n e di n
Section 2, at time t, the agent’s information is given by at−1 and yt−1 while the market’s information is
given by yt−1. This section shows that for all histories yt−1 that imply bmt, the compensation is the same.
Similarly, for all histories yt−1 and at−1 that imply bat and bmt,t h eo p t i m a le ﬀort level is the same. This
allows us to present a recursive formulation of the model that facilitates the study of career concerns when
we consider that the agent’s decisions depend on his reputation. We shall also discus the existence and
uniqueness of the agent’s equilibrium eﬀort strategy.
This section considers a general career-concern compensation scheme in which the compensation de-
pends on the market’s belief about the agent’s future productivity in an unspeciﬁed way. We shall show
that for this general compensation scheme the players’ problems can be set up recursively. Sections 4 and
5 present examples of such a compensation scheme. Therefore, in these sections, we can characterize the
optimal strategies as functions of the beliefs.
For characterizing the agent’s strategies, it is assumed that the compensation scheme is such that the
agent’s maximization problems are strictly concave. In sections 4 and 5, when a speciﬁc compensation
scheme is introduced, assumptions that assure the concavity of the agent’s problems are discussed. It is
also assumed that the compensation is weakly increasing with respect to the agent’s expected productivity.
In general, the employer has to pay more to the agent when the agent is believed to be more productive
because otherwise another ﬁr mi nt h em a r k e tw o u l do ﬀer more to the agent. Moreover, if it is believed
that the agent has higher productive ability, this may also allow him to work in a “better” position.
We use backward induction. We show that in period T, the agent exerts no eﬀort, and, therefore, the
compensation is determined by the market’s belief. Then it is shown that in period T −1, the equilibrium
eﬀort level is determined by beliefs. Given that the agent’s future eﬀort levels depend only on beliefs,
in period T − 1, the compensation depends only on the market’s belief. Then it is shown that in period
9T − 2, the equilibrium eﬀort level is determined by beliefs and so on.
3.1 Period-T − 1 equilibrium eﬀort strategy
In period T − 1, the agent exerts eﬀort to inﬂuence his period-T compensation. Thus, for characterizing
the period-T −1 equilibrium eﬀort strategy, it is necessary to characterize the period-T compensation. In
period T, the agent cannot inﬂuence any future compensation, and, therefore, he always chooses aT =0 .
Consequently, the expected productivity of the agent in period T is determined by his expected ability.
Hence, in deciding wT, the market only considers the ability he expects the agent to have in period
T. The market’s information is the history of outputs yT−1. However, because of the recursiveness
of Bayesian learning, the agent’s excepted ability is given by bmT.L e t ωT (bmT) denote the period-T
compensation. Given that the compensation is weakly increasing with respect to the agent’s expected
productivity, ωT (bmT) is weakly increasing with respect to bmT. These conclusions are summarized in the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 For all histories yT−1 and aT−1, aT
¡
yT−1,a T−1¢
=0 . Therefore, for any bmT, the period-T
compensation is the same for all yT−1 ∈ Y T−1 ¡
bmT,a T−1 ¡
yT−2¢¢
. Moreover, the period-T compensation
is weakly increasing with respect to bmT.
Consequently, at period T −1, for all histories yT−2 and aT−2 that imply baT−1 and bmT−1, the agent’s
















where E denotes the expectation operator (the agent is uncertain about ηT−1, and he believes that ηT−1
is distributed according to baT−1).
This maximization problem shows that the optimal eﬀort level may depend on the agent’s belief, baT−1,




for any baT−1 and bmT−1,i ft h ee ﬀort level expected by the market depends on yT−2, then the optimal
eﬀort level could indeed depend on yT−2.
Assuming that the compensation ωT (bmT) is such that problem 5 is strictly concave assures that for
ag i v e ne ﬀort level expected by the market, aT−1
¡
yT−2¢
, there exists a unique optimal eﬀort level given
10by the ﬁrst-order condition of problem 5. This does not guarantee that the equilibrium eﬀort strategy
exists and is unique. Recall that in order to ﬁnd the equilibrium eﬀort strategy, we have to solve a ﬁxed
point problem. The eﬀort level expected by the market has to be equal to the eﬀort level the agent exerts




, the agent chooses aT−1
¡
yT−2¢
. It could be more than one aT−1
¡
yT−2¢




, the agent’s optimal eﬀort level is given by aT−1
¡
yT−2¢
. However, the next
lemma shows that a unique equilibrium eﬀort strategy exists. Moreover, the equilibrium eﬀort level is
the same for all histories yT−2 that imply the same equilibrium beliefs (the proof is provided in Appendix
A).10
Lemma 2 In period T −1, on the equilibrium path, for any bT−1, an equilibrium eﬀort level exists and is




The intuition behind this result is clear. Asides from determining beliefs, yT−2 only aﬀects problem 5
through the eﬀort level expected by the market, aT−1
¡
yT−2¢
.T h i s e ﬀort level aﬀects the marginal beneﬁt
of exerting eﬀort through the signal inferred by the market, ηmT−1
¡
yT−2¢
. However, in equilibrium, the




ηT−1, which does not depend on yT−2. Thus, the equilibrium eﬀort strategy only depends on yT−2 through
the beliefs.
Lemma 2 shows that we can characterize the agent’s equilibrium eﬀort at T − 1 as a function of
the players’ beliefs (that in equilibrium are coincidental). Let αT−1 (bT−1) denote this function where
αT−1 (bT−1) is deﬁned by










The agent exerts eﬀort because the marginal cost of exerting eﬀort is compensated by an expected increase
in next-period compensation (a higher aT−1 implies a higher bmT, and, therefore, implies that the agent’s
10Martinez [2004] discusses a ﬁring model of career concerns in which the convexity of the agent’s problem implies that the
agent’s equilibrium strategy does not exist even though an optimal eﬀort level exists for each eﬀort expected by the principal.
It is also shown that in a more general framework, if the agent’s problem is strictly concave, the agent’s equilibrium action
exists and is unique.
11expected compensation is higher). In equation 6, eﬀort does not appear in the right-hand side because,
in equilibrium, the agent chooses the eﬀort expected by the market. Therefore, the signal inferred by the
market is the true signal (ηmT−1
¡
yT−2¢




= µbT−1 +( 1− µ)ηT−1.
3.2 Period-T − 2 equilibrium eﬀort strategy
For period T −2, the same logic applies. Asides from determining beliefs, the history yT−3 only aﬀects the








. However, in equilibrium, the eﬀort level exerted by the agent is equal to the eﬀort
level expected by the market, and, therefore, the signal inferred by the market is the true signal, and is
independent of yT−3.
In order to ﬁnd the period-T − 2 equilibrium eﬀort strategy, the T − 1 compensation needs to be
characterized. In period T − 1, the market knows that future eﬀort levels only depend on the history of
the game through the agent’s reputation. Therefore, the agent’s expected productivity only depends on
bmT−1, and, consequently, the compensation only depends bmT−1. This is summarized in the following
corollary of lemma 2.
Corollary 1 In period T − 1, for any market’s belief bmT−1, the compensation is the same for all output




In period T − 2, when deciding his eﬀort level, the agent considers how his eﬀort would aﬀect his
next-period expected lifetime utility. Therefore, before writing the agent’s problem, it is useful to consider
his expected lifetime utility at the beginning of T − 1 and how it depends on aT−2.W e s h a l l s h o w t h a t
the agent’s expected lifetime utility depends on the history of the game only through the beliefs.
L e m m a2s h o w st h a ti np e r i o dT − 1, on the equilibrium path, the agent’s equilibrium eﬀort strategy,
αT−1 (bT−1), only depends on the history of the game through the players’ beliefs, bT−1. Therefore, the
market’s belief is suﬃcient for determining the eﬀort it expects. Consequently, in period T − 1,o ﬀ the
equilibrium path, the agent’s optimal eﬀort only depends on yT−2 through the beliefs (recall that aside
from determining beliefs, yT−2 only aﬀects problem 5 through the eﬀort expected by the market). This is
summarized in the following corollary of Lemma 2.
12Corollary 2 In period T − 1,f o ra n ybmT−1 and baT−1, the optimal eﬀort level is the same for all yT−2
and aT−2 such that yT−2 ∈ Y T−2 ¡
bmT−1,a T−2 ¡
yT−3¢¢
and yT−2 ∈ Y T−2 ¡
baT−1,a T−2¢
.
Given that the optimal eﬀort at T −1 only depends on the history of the game through the beliefs, the
agent’s expected lifetime utility at the beginning of T − 1 only depends on the beliefs. Let
ZT−1 (ba,b m)=ωT−1 (bm) − c(αT−1 (ba,b m)) + δEηT−1 [ωT (Bm (bm,η,αT−1 (ba,b m),αT−1 (bm)))|ba]
denote this utility where ba and bm characterize the agent’s and the market’s beliefs, respectively, αT−1 (ba,b m)
denotes the optimal eﬀort for these beliefs, and ωT−1 (bm) denotes the period-T − 1 compensation for bm.





















We shall focus on situations in which the agent would exert eﬀort because of career concerns. Therefore,
the following discussion assumes that the agent expects ZT−1 to increase with respect to bmT−1 (speciﬁc
assumptions are discussed when the compensation scheme is speciﬁed in sections 4 and 5).11
Following the same logic used for period T −1, one can prove that at T −2, a unique equilibrium eﬀort
exists. Moreover, the equilibrium eﬀort is the same for all histories yT−3 that imply the same equilibrium
belief bT−2. T h i si ss u m m a r i z e di nthe following lemma:
Lemma 3 In period T −2, on the equilibrium path, for any bT−2, an equilibrium eﬀort level exists and is




The equilibrium eﬀort strategy, αT−2 (bT−2),s a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition of problem 7 when the
eﬀort expected by the market aT−2
¡
yT−3¢
equals αT−2 (bT−2), i.e., it satisﬁes
















11The agent’s eﬀort increases bmT−1 (see equation 4). Consequently, the agent exerts eﬀort if and only if he expects ZT−1
to be increasing with respect to bmT−1. Section 5 explains why ZT−1 may be decreasing with respect to bmT−1.
13In equation 8, as in equation 6, eﬀort does not appear in the right-hand side because, in equilibrium,
the agent chooses the eﬀort level expected by the market. Moreover, the right-hand side of equation 8 is
positive (as explained above, career concerns are only relevant if it is positive). Thus, equation 8 shows




3.3 Period-t equilibrium eﬀort strategy
The analysis of any period before T − 2 parallels that above. In period T − 2, the market knows that
future eﬀort levels only depend on the agent’s reputation, and, therefore, the period-T − 2 compensation
only depends on bmT−2. The agent’s period-T −2 expected lifetime utility only depends on the history of
the game through beliefs, and, therefore, the equilibrium eﬀort level in period T − 3 only depends on the
history of the game through beliefs. The same is true for any period before T − 3. T h i si ss u m m a r i z e d
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In period t, for any bat and bmt,a n df o ra l lyt−1 and at−1 such that yt−1 ∈ Y t−1 ¡
bmt,a t−1 ¡
yt−2¢¢
and yt−1 ∈ Y t−1 ¡
bat,a t−1¢
, the optimal eﬀort level, αt (bat,b mt), is the same . The compensation, ωt (bm),
is the same for all yt−1 ∈ Y t−1 ¡
bmt,a t−1 ¡
yt−2¢¢
. Moreover, the optimal eﬀort level exists, is unique, and
is given by
(9) c0(αt (bat,b mt)) = δ
∂Eη [Zt+1 (B (bat,η),B m (bmt,η,αt (bat,b mt),αt (bmt)))|bat]
∂at
where
Zt (ba,b m)=ωt (bm) − c(αt (ba,b m)) + δEηt [Zt+1 (B (ba,η),B m (bm,η,αt (ba,b m),αt (bm)))|ba].
Given equation 9, if the agent’s period-t +1strategy is known, his period-t strategy can easily be
obtained. Thus, it is easy to solve the model by backward induction.
4A b e n c h m a r k
This section provides a benchmark following previous studies of career concerns in assuming that the
compensation equals the agent’s expected productivity.12 Following Section 3, we can write the equilibrium
12Holmstrom [1999] explains that this compensation scheme would result if the principal is a risk-neutral ﬁrm in a competitive
market and the history of outputs produced by the agent is known by every ﬁrm in the market. However, this compensation
14eﬀort as a function of the beliefs. Thus, the compensation scheme is given by
(10) ωt (bmt)=bmt + αt (bmt).
Following section 3, we know that in period T, the agent always choose aT =0 . Therefore, ωT (bmT)=






µbmT−1 +( 1− µ)
¡






In this problem, the expected compensation is linear in eﬀort and the marginal gain from exerting
eﬀort does not depend on the beliefs. The agent’s incentives are independent of how talented he believes
he is, baT−1, how talented the market believes the agent is, bmT−1,a n dt h ee ﬀort expected by the market,
αT−1 (bmt−1). This is the case in previous studies of career concerns: the agent’s decisions do not depend
on his reputation.
Problem 11 is concave, and the optimal eﬀort level ˆ aT−1 is characterized by
(12) c0(ˆ aT−1)=δ (1 − µ).
With his eﬀort level, the agent aﬀects his future compensation through the signal inferred by the market.
Therefore, equilibrium eﬀort is higher if the agent is more concerned about the future (δ is higher), or the
weight of the signal in bmT is higher (1 − µ is higher).
The agent’s T − 1 compensation is given by ωT−1 = bmT−1 +ˆ aT−1. The agent’s expected utility at
the beginning of T − 1 is given by





























scheme is not consistent with compensation schemes observed in reality (see, for example, Bernhardt [1995], and Gibbons and
Waldman [1999]). Section 5 incorporates a realistic feature to the compensation scheme considered that allows us to study
how the agent’s decisions depend on his reputation.
15Problem 13 is concave, and the optimal eﬀort level ˆ aT−2 is characterized by
(14) c0(ˆ aT−2)=δ (1 − µ)+δ2µ(1 − µ).
The equilibrium eﬀort is independent of the agent’s reputation.
As illustrated by problem 13, in this framework, the agent’s problems are static. There is no link
between the agent’s decision in the current period and his future decisions. In Section 5, this is not the
case, and the agent faces an eﬀort-smoothing decision.
T h es a m el o g i ca l l o w su st oﬁnd the equilibrium strategies for periods before T −2.T h e s e ﬁndings are
summarized in the following proposition (that gives the ﬁnite-horizon version of the result in Holmstrom
[1999]).
Proposition 2 In period t, the compensation scheme is given by ωt (bmt)=bmt+ˆ at where the equilibrium
eﬀort level, ˆ at, is given by





The following corollaries of Proposition 2 (discussed in Section 5.3) characterize the equilibrium eﬀort
decision in equation 15.
Corollary 3 The equilibrium eﬀort level decreases with respect to t.
Corollary 4 The equilibrium eﬀort level is decreasing with respect to h¯ η, and it is increasing with respect
to hε.
Corollary 5 The equilibrium eﬀort level is never greater than the eﬃcient eﬀort level, ¯ a,d e ﬁned by
c0 (¯ a)=1 .I t i s o n l y e q u a l t o ¯ a in the inﬁnite-horizon version of the model with δ =1 .
The next section shows that some of the results in previous studies of career concerns are not robust
to changes in the career-concern compensation scheme considered. In particular, the agent faces an
intertemporal eﬀort smoothing decision; the equilibrium eﬀort level depends on the agent’s reputation;
and none of the corollaries presented in this section hold.
165 A discontinuous compensation scheme
If the agent exerts eﬀort to inﬂuence his future reputation, it seems natural to expect that his decisions
would depend on his current reputation. Section 3 shows that in general, this is indeed the case in
models of career concerns. Therefore, considering this should be an integral part of studying the evolution
of the agent’s decisions over his career as well as the design of contracts that complement career-concern
incentives. Section 4 shows how in previous models of career concerns, under carefully chosen assumptions,
the agent’s decisions do not depend on his reputation. In particular, as illustrated in problem 11, previous
studies assume that the expected compensation is linear in eﬀort and the marginal gain from exerting
eﬀort is independent from the agent’s reputation. In order to study how the agent’s decisions depend
on his reputation, this section moves away from this assumption considering a realistic feature of many
compensation schemes: the compensation scheme may present discontinuities.13 That is, a small change
in the agent’s reputation may imply a large change in his compensation.14 Discontinuous compensation
schemes are widely observed.
First, as documented by the empirical literature, the agent may be assigned to diﬀerent levels in a
hierarchy according to his reputation, and these reassignments often imply a discontinuous change in the
agent’s compensation. For example, Murphy [1985] ﬁnds that “presidents promoted to chief executive
oﬃcer received one-time salary increases of 14.3%, and vice presidents promoted to president or chief ex-
13Problem 11 shows that there are a number of assumptions in the benchmark that could be modiﬁed to obtain a relationship
between the agent’s decision and his current reputation. As a natural ﬁrst step toward understanding how the agent’s
reputation aﬀects his incentives, this paper considers only one departure from this framework that makes eﬀort depend on
reputation (a departure that we consider particularly interesting). The framework presented in the paper would be useful to
study the eﬀect of changing other assumptions (see Martinez [2004]). The dynamic eﬀects explained in the paper are robust
to changes in other assumptions.
14Previous models of career concerns considering discontinuous compensation schemes present either two-period frameworks
or repeated two-period relationships (for example, studying term limits). Therefore, in these studies, the agent’s equilibrium
action does not depend on his reputation. This is the case in the large literature on political agency started by Barro [1973]
and discussed by Besley [2005] (Besley and Case [1995] and Hess and Orphanides [1995, 2001] present empirical evidence
supporting this theory). An exception to this is the work by Ashworth [2001] who presents a three-period-political-agency
model. However, his paper does not consider that the principal’s belief and the agent’s belief may be diﬀerent oﬀ equilibrium.
17ecutive oﬃcer received average increases of 20.9% and 42.9%, respectively.” Kwon [2005] also ﬁnds that
incentives are largely provided by promotions, and the probability of a promotion depends on the agent’s
performance. There is a theoretical literature explaining why a ﬁrm would choose this compensation struc-
ture. For example, Bernhardt [1995] accounts for these observations in a framework in which the agent’s
promotion signals his ability to other ﬁrms, and implies a discontinuous increase in his compensation. In
this section, these situations are represented by an exogenous discontinuous compensation scheme.15
Furthermore, capacity constraints (for example, there is a ﬁnite number of CEOs, governors, and NBA
players) imply that the employer replaces the incumbent agent if the employer expects to be better oﬀ
with a replacement (see, for example, Martinez [2005]).16 In general, the agent is not indiﬀerent about
losing his position. For example, Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo [2005] ﬁnd that the means of the monetized
values of a House seat and a Senate seat in 1995 dollars are equal to $616,228 and $1,673,763, respectively.
Murphy [1985] ﬁnds that “An executive who loses his CEO status but remains as chairman of the board
receives, on average, a 16.1% cut in pay.” Firing incentives are especially important for the positions that
are crucial for the performance of an economy because these positions usually have a unique character that
gives value to keeping the job.17 Thus, the insights provided in this section allow several applications.
One is the study of the more typical employees’ eﬀort-choice decisions (as in Holmstrom [1999]). An
alternative is the study of the conﬂict of interest between politicians and voters, as applied to pure rent
seeking (as in the models in Persson and Tabellini [2000]), to the cyclical manipulation of ﬁscal policy (as
in Shi and Svensson [2002]), or to monetary policy (as in Eggertsson and Le Borgne [2005]).
15The compensation scheme could be made endogenous with a model of the labor market similar to the one presented by
Bernhardt [1995]. For expositional simplicity, this paper does not to do so, and focuses on the career-concern incentives
implied by this scheme that, for example, Bernhardt [1995] left unexplored.
16In a model without learning about ability where the principal uses long-term contracts for providing incentives to the
incumbent agent on the job, Spear and Wang [2005] show that the principal may want to replace the incumbent because
it may be more costly to induce the incumbent to exert eﬀort than to induce a new agent to exert eﬀort. In a model of
career concerns that allows for ﬁring, if incentive contracts were considered, the ﬁring motives in Spear and Wang [2005] could
appear.
17Empirical studies document the way in which the turnover of politicians (for a review, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
[2000]) and managers (see, for example, Khorana [1996], and Mian [2001]) is related with past performance.
18Similarly, a discontinuous change in the employee’s compensation may be observed if he is assigned to
diﬀerent sectors in the economy according to his reputation. MacDonald (1982) presents a model in which
workers are assigned to diﬀerent tasks depending on their reputation, and their productivity depends on
the task they are assigned to.
In other to study the agent’s career-concern incentives in these situations (in which he faces a discon-





wG ifbmt ≥ bG
wB otherwise
where wG >w B.18 This compensation scheme may be interpreted as the agent being assigned to the good
occupation if his reputation is good enough, and to the bad occupation otherwise (and receiving a higher
compensation while in the good occupation).19
5.1 Equilibrium eﬀort strategy
We focus on situations in which the agent would exert eﬀort because of career concerns, and, therefore, we
assume that the agent expects his next-period lifetime utility to increase if he exerts a higher eﬀort in the
current-period (speciﬁc assumptions are discussed below).
18The results presented here do not change much if wG and wB depend on the agent’s reputation. Even if this is not
the case, if by improving his reputation the agent increases the probability of receiving wG in every future period, he always
beneﬁts from a better reputation (as when wG and wB depend on the agent’s reputation). Assuming that wG and wB do
not depend on reputation simpliﬁes the analysis and allows us to focus on the incentives generated by a discontinuity in the
compensation scheme.
19The model studied in this section assumes that the learning process about the agent’s ability is not aﬀected by the
occupation in which the agent is working (this is also the case in previous studies; see, for example, Gibbons and Waldman
[1999]). It could be assumed, for example, that the agent has a diﬀerent ability for each occupation and the bad-occupation
output is a worse signal of the good-occupation ability than the good-occupation output. For expositional simplicity, this is
not considered. Alternatively, previous studies on career concerns considering ﬁring present a compensation rule similar to
the one studied here but assume that, after the agent is ﬁred, there is no more learning about his ability and, therefore, the
agent can never go back to the job (or the good occupation). These intertemporal eﬀects of ﬁring incentives do not much
aﬀect the results presented here (see Martinez [2005]). As in previous studies of career concerns, the agent participation
decision is not studied here. It is assumed that the agent always works and he works in the occupation he is assigned to.
19This section proceeds by characterizing the agent’s equilibrium strategy through the ﬁrst-order con-
dition of the agent’s problem.20 Let fx denote the density function for a normally distributed random




denotes the signal η required for B (b,η)=bG. The following proposition shows how we can represent
the agent’s incentives in the Euler equation corresponding to the agent’s problem (see Appendix B for the
proof).
Proposition 3 In period t<T, for any bt, the equilibrium eﬀort level,αt(bt), is given by
(17) c0 (αt(bt)) = δ (wG − wB)fbt (ηG (bt)) + δ
Z ∞
−∞
rt (B (bt,ηt))c0 (αt+1(B (bt,ηt)))fbt (ηt)dηt
where






= µ − (1 − µ)α0
t+1 (bm),
(19) ηmt (bm) ≡ yt − αt (bm),
and α0
t (b) denotes the derivative of αt (b) with respect to b.
A unique period-t equilibrium strategy, αt, can easily be obtained from equation 17 once a unique
period-t +1equilibrium strategy, αt+1, is known. Therefore, the unique equilibrium strategies can easily
be obtained by solving the model backwards.
20Assumptions are needed to guarantee the concavity of the agent’s problem. For example, the probability of receiving
wG next period is not a globally concave function of eﬀort. In order to assure the global concavity of the agent’s problem,
it is suﬃcient to assume enough convexity in the cost function. For example, one could ﬁnd an upper bound for the slope
of the marginal beneﬁt curve and assume that the slope of the marginal cost curve is always higher (this is particularly easy
for T − 1). Another alternative is to assume the standard exponential cost function, c(a)=a
n, and to assume that n is high
enough. Consequently, the marginal cost is very low for a low a and, for a high enough a, it starts increasing very rapidly,
assuring that the marginal cost curve crosses the marginal beneﬁt curve only once (from below) and the problem is globally
concave (see Martinez [2005]).
20The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of equation 17 represents the next-period gain from exerting eﬀort.
It represents the gain from increasing the probability of receiving wG next period. The next-period gain is
given by the change in the occupational compensation, wG−wB, multiplied by the change in the probability
of receiving wG next period, fbt (ηG (bt)), and discounted by δ.
The second term in the right-hand side of equation 17 represents the job-value gain from exerting
eﬀort. The job-value gain describes the typical intertemporal tradeoﬀ in dynamic models: having less
utility today allows an agent to have more utility next period. For example, to inﬂuence his compensation
at t +2(and at every period after t +2 ), the agent can exert eﬀort in t and in t +1 . Thus, the agent
compares the costs and the eﬀectiveness of exerting eﬀort in t and in t +1 . Previous studies on career
concerns consider only situations in which the agent faces an intratemporal decision each period. This
paper presents a tractable framework that allows us to analyze the agent’s intertemporal decisions as well.
In equation 17, rt represents the relative eﬀectiveness in changing the market’s future beliefs (and,
therefore, the probability of receiving wG in the future) of exerting eﬀort in t (compared with exerting
eﬀort in t+1). For example, to inﬂuence his compensation at t+2, the agent needs to aﬀect bmt+2.T h e
agent’s eﬀort in t aﬀects bmt+1 directly, and aﬀects bmt+2 through bmt+1 (as indicated in equation 4). His
eﬀort in t +1aﬀects bmt+2 directly. Thus, the relative eﬀectiveness of at (compared with at+1), rt,i s




, with respect to bmt+1,w h e r e
ηmt (bmt) ≡ yt −αt (bmt) denotes the signal inferred by the market. If rt is lower than one, it implies that
at was (relatively) less eﬀective than at+1 in changing bmt+2.
In previous studies, because the eﬀort expected by the market does not depend on the agent’s reputation,
ah i g h e rbmt always implies that for a given eﬀort level, a higher bmt+1 is more likely. In this paper,
this does not need to be the case. For example, suppose that the eﬀort expected by the market is
increasing with respect to the reputation bmt (see Section 5.2). Then, at t,i fbmt is higher, and the
market believes the agent exerted a higher eﬀort level, αt (bmt), for any output yt, the market infers a
lower signal ηmt (bmt) ≡ yt − αt (bmt). The market thinks that yt is the result of a high eﬀort and a low
signal. Consequently, the agent’s reputation at t +1may be worse if his reputation at date t is better,
i.e., bmt+1 = B (bmt,ηmt (bmt)) may be decreasing with respect to bmt (and the relative eﬀectiveness of at−1
may be negative).21
21A negative expected relative eﬀectiveness may imply a negative job-value gain. If the job-value gain is negative enough,
21Equation 17 shows that equilibrium eﬀort depends on the agent’s reputation (in contrast to the bench-
mark case presented in Section 4). Next, we shall discuss how the agent’s reputation aﬀects his decisions.
5.2 Incentives and reputation
Would an agent with a better reputation face stronger career-concern incentives, or would such an agent
be more diﬃcult to control? This section helps answer this question by studying the relationship between
the strength of career-concern incentives and the agent’s reputation.
First, let us focus on the next-period gain. Reputation only aﬀects the next-period gain through the
density function for signals evaluated at the minimum signal required for the agent to have an expected
ability equal to the occupational threshold bG.
Even though on the equilibrium path the players’ beliefs are always coincidental, the role of each of these
beliefs on the agent’s decision can be studied separately. The market’s belief determines the minimum
signal required for obtaining wG next period. For example, if at the beginning of the period the market
believes the agent is very talented, the agent may receive wG next period even if the current-period signal is
low (because the market’s next-period belief may still be good enough). The agent’s belief determines the
signal density function he uses for evaluating his problem. Loosely speaking, it determines how likely he
thinks it is that a certain signal is realized. In the next-period-gain term, the density reads fbat (ηG(bmt))
(but on the equilibrium path bat = bmt). The next lemma describes the relationship between the agent’s
belief and the strength of the next-period gain incentives (see Appendix C for the proof).
Lemma 4 On the equilibrium path, fbat (ηG(bmt)) is increasing with respect to bat if and only if bmt <b G.
Moreover, fbat (ηG(bmt)) is decreasing with respect to bat if and only if bmt >b G,a n d
∂fbat(ηG(bmt))
∂bat =0if
and only if bmt = bG.
eﬀort decreases the agent’s expected lifetime utility, and, therefore, the agent may choose not to exert eﬀort. Furthermore, if
αt (bt) is decreasing with respect to bt, the expected yt can be decreasing with respect to bt. With an endogenous compensation
scheme, this would imply that ωt (bmt) is decreasing with respect to bmt, and, therefore, the agent could choose not to exert
eﬀort (see Martinez [2005]). An interior solution to the agent’s problem can be guaranteed with assumptions that limit the
responsiveness of eﬀort to changes in reputation. The relationship between equilibrium eﬀort and reputation is discussed in
section 5.2. It is easy to see that for example, a low enough value of wG − wB and/or a low enough value of the precision in
the signal distributions, H, can guarantee an interior solution.
22The intuition for this result is as follows. The next-period-gain beneﬁts of exerting eﬀort are given by
the change in the probability of receiving wG next period multiplied by wG − wB and the discount factor.
This probability change is represented by fbat (ηG(bmt)) that loosely speaking, represents the probability
of having the minimum signal required for receiving wG next period, ηG(bmt). When the market’s belief
is high (bmt >b G), the current-period minimum signal the agent needs for receiving wG next period is low
(i.e., given a high bmt, ηG(bmt) is low). When the agent believes he is better (i.e., when bat is higher), he
believes that a low signal is less likely (i.e., fbat (ηG(bmt)) is lower). Consequently, when the agent believes
he is better, he has weaker incentives to exert eﬀort. A parallel argument applies when bmt <b G.22
The next lemma characterizes the relationship between the market’s belief and the next-period gain
(the proof is provided in Appendix D).
Lemma 5 On the equilibrium path, fbat (ηG(bmt)) is increasing with respect to bmt if and only if bat <b G.
Moreover, fbat (ηG(bmt)) is decreasing with respect to bmt if and only if bat >b G and
∂fbat(ηG(bmt))
∂bmt =0if
and only if bat = bG.
This lemma says that when the agent expects his ability to be high (low), he has weaker (stronger)
incentives to exert eﬀort when the market believes the agent is better. The intuition behind this result
is straightforward. Under the normality assumption for the signal density functions, more extreme signal
values are less likely (the result holds for all density functions with this property). In other words, if the
value of signal is more extreme (i.e., if the signal is further from the mean), the density function evaluated
at the signal is lower. Suppose the agent expects his ability to be high (bat >b G). Recall that on the
equilibrium path the market’s belief coincides with the agent’s belief, and, therefore, the market’s belief is
high (bmt = bat >b G). Then, the minimum signal realization that would allow the agent to receive wG
next period is low (ηG(bmt) <b G). In particular, the minimum signal is lower than the expected signal,
bat. If the market believes the agent is better, the minimum signal is lower and further from the expected
signal, and, therefore, is less likely. That is, when the agent expects his ability to be high (bat >b G),
fbat (ηG(bmt)) is decreasing with respect to bmt, and the agent has weaker incentives to exert eﬀort if the
market believes he is better. A parallel argument applies when bat <b G.
22As this intuition suggests, this result holds under more general assumptions about fba (η) (it is only required that low
signals are less likely for better agents).
23In period T − 1, given that the only incentives are those captured by the next-period gain, lemmas 4
and 5 imply that equilibrium eﬀort is hump-shaped over reputation, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In period T − 1,a na g e n tw h oi sb e l i e v e dt ob em o r e( l e s s )t a l e n t e de x e r t sm o r ee ﬀort if
and only if his reputation is worse (better) than bG.
In general, the job-value gain preserves the nonmonotonicity of the next-period gain. We will explain
the intuition for period T −2 but the same logic applies for all periods. We are interested in describing how
eﬀort in period T − 2 depends on reputation. Recall that the job-value gain is represented (in equation
17) by the expected marginal cost of exerting eﬀort next period (weighted by the relative eﬀectiveness).
Suppose the agent’s reputation is represented by b at T − 2. Then, the agent knows that his reputation
at T − 1 is likely to be close to b. If for reputations close to b equilibrium eﬀort is high (low) at T − 1,
then the expected marginal cost of exerting eﬀort at T −1 is high (low), the job-value gain at T −2 is high
(low) for b, and the agent has incentives to exert high (low) eﬀort at T − 2 for b. Thus, typically, for any
reputation b such that eﬀort is high (low) at T −1, it follows that eﬀort is also high (low) at T −2. In other
words, the relationship between reputation and the job-value gain at T −2 follows the same pattern of the
relationship between reputation and equilibrium eﬀort at T −1.I n p a r t i c u l a r , a t T −2, the job-value gain
is hump-shaped over reputation, and equilibrium eﬀort is hump-shaped. The same reasoning applies for
any period t<T− 1. Hence, in general, equilibrium eﬀort is hump-shaped for all t. While equation 17
shows that this general intuition is complicated by the relationship between the agent’s reputation and the
expected relative eﬀectiveness, the main force in play is the one explained above (for numerical examples
see Martinez [2005]).23
5.3 The importance of the compensation scheme
In this section, we show that some of the conclusions presented in previous studies of career concerns, and
replicated in Section 4, are not robust to changes in the career-concern compensation scheme considered.
23For example, if b is low enough, αT−1 (b) i sac o n v e xf u n c t i o no fb. Therefore, rT−2 (b)=µ−(1 − µ)α
0
T−1 (b) is decreasing
with respect to b. Thus, an agent with a better reputation expects the relative eﬀectiveness of his eﬀort to be lower, and
could choose to exert lower eﬀort. In this case, this force contradicts the general intuition described above (recall that if b is
low enough, the expected T − 1 eﬀo r ti si n c r e a s i n gw i t hr e s p e c tt ob).
24More speciﬁcally, with the compensation scheme considered in this section, none of the corollaries presented
in Section 4 hold.
5.3.1 The eﬀect of tenure
Would an agent exert less eﬀort later in his career? Consequently, is the need for contract incentives more
important later in the agent’s career?
Holmstrom [1999] studies an inﬁnite-horizon version of the model presented in Section 4 in which ability
does not change over time, and, therefore, the weight of the period-t belief in the period-t +1belief, µ,
is increasing with respect to the number of observations regarding the agent’s performance. He shows
that the equilibrium eﬀort level is lower for an agent who has been working longer. This is the case
because with more observations of the agent’s performance, the signal has a lower weight in the market’s
next-period belief (µ is higher), and the agent aﬀects the signal with his eﬀort.
This channel is not present in the framework studied in Section 4 (ability is assumed to change in a way
that makes µ constant). Nevertheless, in the ﬁnite-horizon framework studied in Section 4, it remains that
equilibrium eﬀort is decreasing with respect to the number of periods the agent worked. This is the case
because closer to T (that may represent, for example, retirement) improving reputation is less beneﬁcial
because it aﬀects compensations in fewer periods.
On the other hand, in this section, considering a discontinuous compensation scheme allows us to
identify two reasons why an agent may decide to exert more eﬀort later in his career. First, relative
eﬀectiveness may be negative. For example, consider the eﬀort decision in two consecutive periods.
Suppose the equilibrium eﬀort level in the second period is increasing in the agent’s reputation (as is the
case for low-reputation agents). If the agent exerts more eﬀort in the ﬁrst period, he improves his second-
period reputation and, therefore, he makes the market believe that he would exert a higher eﬀort in the
second period. Thus, in the second period, for any output the agent produces, the market believes that
this output was produced with a higher eﬀort and, therefore, the market infers a lower signal of ability.
That is, the ﬁrst-period eﬀort hurts the agent in the second period. In fact, it is easy to construct examples
in which this eﬀect is important enough to make the agent exert no eﬀort in the ﬁrst period.
Second, it is necessary to consider that an agent’s reputation may change over his career. For example,
suppose that the agent’s expected ability is high, and, therefore, he exerts more eﬀort when his reputation
25is worse (see Section 5.2). Then, if the agent’s reputation deteriorates over his career (but it is still high),
the agent may decide to exert more eﬀort later in his career.24
5.3.2 The eﬀectiveness of career-concern incentives
Based on corollary 4, Holmstrom [1999] concludes that career-concern incentives “will work more eﬀectively
if the ability process is more stochastic (the precision in the ability distribution, h¯ η,i sl o w e r )or if the
observations on outputs are more accurate (the precision in the production noise, hε, is higher).”
T h en e x tp r o p o s i t i o ns h o w st h a tt h i sc o n c l u s i o na bout the ability process is not robust to changes in
the career-concern compensation scheme under consideration (see Appendix E for the proof).
Proposition 5 For any bT−1 suﬃciently close to bG, αT−1 (bT−1) is increasing with respect to the precision
in the ability distribution, h¯ η.
In models of career concerns where the agent’s compensation is given by his expected productivity, an
increase in uncertainty about ability (a decrease in h¯ η) only brings about an increase in the quality of the
signal as an indication of ability (and, therefore, an increase in the weight of the current-period signal in
the next-period belief, 1−µ). Given that the agent aﬀects the signal inferred by the market with his eﬀort
level, if the signal weight in the next-period belief is higher, the agent exerts more eﬀort. This explains
the result replicated in Section 4.
When discontinuities in the compensation scheme are considered, the density function for signals de-
termines the marginal beneﬁto fe x e r t i n ge ﬀort, and h¯ η aﬀects incentives through this density function.
Proposition 5 shows that the eﬀect on the density function may imply a positive relationship between eﬀort
and h¯ η, and, furthermore, may dominate the mechanism described in previous studies.
The same two forces are present when changes in the degree of uncertainty in the production process
are considered. However, the next proposition shows that the eﬀect on the signal weight is dominant (see
Appendix F for the proof).
24Martinez [2005] shows that the agent’s eﬀort may be lower further from T in a model in which the compensation is not
d e c i d e di ne v e r yp e r i o d . I naﬁring model of career concerns in which a ﬁred agent never comes back to the job, Martinez
[2004] discusses a third reason for the agent’s eﬀo r tt ob el o w e ri np e r i o d sf u r t h e rf r o mT: t h ev a l u eo fs t a y i n go nt h ej o b
could be lower further from T.
26Proposition 6 For any bT−1, αT−1 (bT−1) is increasing with respect to the precision in the production
noise distribution, hε.
5.3.3 Eﬃciency
If the compensation scheme presents a discontinuity, the result in corollary 5 does not hold either. The
agent’s eﬀort may be higher than the eﬃcient eﬀort. For example, at T −1, the marginal beneﬁto fe x e r t i n g
eﬀort is given by the change in the occupational compensation, wG − wB, multiplied by the change in the
probability of receiving wG next period, and discounted by δ. This marginal beneﬁt may be higher than
one (the marginal product of eﬀort), and, therefore, equilibrium eﬀort may be higher than the eﬃcient
eﬀort–in Section 4, the marginal beneﬁto fe x e r t i n ge ﬀo r ti sg i v e nb yt h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to fe ﬀort
discounted by µ and δ.25
6 Conclusions and Extensions
We studied Holmstrom’s [1999] seminal model of career concerns, but considered that a small change in the
agent’s reputation may imply a large change in his compensation–because, for example, the agent may
be ﬁred and/or promoted. This allowed us to study how the agent’s decisions depend on his reputation.
We showed that if the compensation scheme presents a discontinuity, the agent faces an intertemporal
eﬀort-smoothing decision, and equilibrium eﬀort is hump-shaped over reputation. The players’ problems
can be set up recursively. That is, for all histories that imply the same beliefs, the players’ optimal actions
are identical. This facilitates the study of career concerns when we consider that the agent’s decisions
depend on his reputation. It was also shown that some of the conclusions presented in previous studies are
not robust to changes in the career-concern compensation scheme considered: career-concern incentives
may work more eﬀectively if there is more dispersion in the distribution of abilities; the agent may decide
to exert more eﬀort later in his career; and the equilibrium eﬀort level may be greater than the eﬃcient
eﬀort level.
25Holmstrom [1999] discusses other variations of the model in section 4 that may imply that equilibrium eﬀort is higher
than the eﬃcient eﬀort level.
27Other modiﬁcations of the model presented in this paper would provide interesting insights on agency
relationships. For example, one could study situations in which the agent’s compensation is not decided
after every output observation (see Martinez [2005]). Moreover, because previous work on career concerns
do not study how reputation aﬀects incentives, one wonders what could be learned from considering this
relationship. Therefore, there are many other possible applications for the framework presented here.26
Furthermore, it seems natural to test the empirical implications of the model. Previous empirical studies
on career concerns follow the theoretical literature and focus on the relationship between incentives and the
number of observations of the agent’s output without considering reputation (see, for example, Chevalier
and Ellison [1999], Stiroh [2003], and Wilczynski [2004]). For empirical work, past performance could
be used as an indication of reputation, and, for empirical studies about the career-concern incentives of
politicians, approval ratings can be used as a measure of reputation (for example, job approval ratings
for U.S. governors, senators, and presidents are available at http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/jars.html). As
a natural ﬁrst step toward understanding how the agent’s reputation aﬀects his incentives, this paper
considers only one departure from Holmstrom [1999] that makes eﬀort depend on reputation. Analyzing
other channels (for example, introducing wealth eﬀects in the agent’s utility function) may deepen the
understanding of the role of reputation.27
26For example, in Prendergast and Stole [1996], the agent makes investment decisions in order to aﬀect the principal’s
perception about the agent’s ability to learn. They show how the agent’s incentives depend on the number of periods he has
been working but they do not consider how reputation would aﬀect incentives. Variations of the model presented here could
also be used for studying the role of reputation in monopoly regulation and the ratchet eﬀect (see, for example, Meyer and
Vickers [1997]).
27For example, Martinez [2004] shows that, if there is a complementarity in production between eﬀort and ability, this
complementarity could imply an inverse relationship between the strength of next-period-gain incentives and reputation.
However, this eﬀect is dominated by the nonmonotonicity described in this paper (Holmstrom [1999] indicates that with a
multiplicative production function, the marginal productivity of eﬀort is higher when ability is higher and, therefore, we
could expect equilibrium eﬀort to be increasing in reputation). The framework presented here is useful to study these other
channels. The dynamic eﬀects are the same (although the relationship between eﬀort and reputation could be aﬀected).
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31Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2
On the equilibrium path, for any history yT−2, expected eﬀort aT−1
¡
yT−2¢
,a n db e l i e f sbT−1;t h e






µbT−1 +( 1− µ)
¡






Let ˆ aT−1 denote the equilibrium eﬀort level (ˆ aT−1 satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition in equation 20 when











The right-hand side in equation 21 does not depend on ˆ aT−1 and is nonnegative (because ωT is a weakly
increasing function). Therefore, there exists a unique ˆ aT−1 that satisﬁes equation 21. Consequently, for




Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
Let Wt(ba,b m) denote the agent’s expected lifetime utility at the moment he decides on his period-t
eﬀort (i.e., after he received the period-t compensation). In period t<T , the agent’s maximization
problem is given by





δwB + δ (wG − wB)[1− Fbt (ηG (bt) − at + αt (bt))] + ...
+δ
R ∞





For all t<T,t h eﬁrst-order condition for this problem, evaluated in equilibrium (imposing at = αt (bt)),
reads





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
B(bt,ηt),B(bt,ηt)
(1 − µ)fbt (ηt)dηt
where, ∂WT
∂bm =0 , and, for all t<T− 1




Wt+2(B (bat,ηt),B m (bmt,ηt,αt+1 (bat,b mt),αt+1(bmt)))fbat (ηt)dηt − ...
−c(αt+1 (bat,b mt)).
32By the envelope theorem, for all t<T− 1,
∂Wt+1
∂bm
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Evaluated at ba = bm = B (b,η),
∂Wt+1
∂bm





































c0 (αt+1 (B (b,η))).
Substituting into equation 22 yields




µ − (1 − µ)α0
t+1 (B (bt,ηt))
¤
c0 (αt+1 (B (bt,ηt)))fbt (ηt)dηt.
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 4
Recall that fbat denotes the density for a normally distributed random variable with mean bat,a n dt h a t
ηG(bmt) is decreasing with respect to bmt.M o r e o v e r , ηG(bG)=bG. On the equilibrium path, bat = bmt.
Consequently, if bat = bmt >b G,t h e nηG(bmt) < ηG(bG)=bG <b at. Therefore, fbat (ηG (bmt)) is decreasing
with respect to bat.I f bat = bmt <b G,t h e nηG(bmt) > ηG(bG)=bG >b at. Therefore, fbat (ηG (bmt))
is increasing with respect to bat.I f bat = bmt = bG and, consequently, ηG (bmt)=ηG (bG)=bat,t h e n
∂fbat(bat)
∂bat =0 .
A p p e n d i xD : P r o o fo fL e m m a5
Recall that fb (η) increases with respect to η i fa n do n l yi fη <b . On the equilibrium path, bat = bmt.
If bat = bmt >b G,t h e nηG(bmt) <b G <b at,a n dfbat (ηG(bmt)) is decreasing with respect to bmt.I f
bat = bmt <b G,t h e nηG(bmt) >b G >b at,a n dfbat (ηG(bmt)) is increasing with respect to bmt.I f
bat = bmt = bG, ηG(bmt)=bG = bat,a n d
∂fbat(bmt)
∂bmt =0 .
33A p p e n d i xE : P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .



































For bT−1 close to bG, this derivative is small enough to be dominated by
√
H being increasing with respect
to h¯ η, making the next-period gain increasing with respect to h¯ η. Given that the marginal cost of exerting
eﬀort is increasing, the equilibrium eﬀort level is increasing with respect to h¯ η.
A p p e n d i xF : P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Recall that
√


















































is non-decreasing with respect to hε. Given that the marginal cost of exerting eﬀort is increasing, equilib-
rium eﬀort increases with hε.
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